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Abstract
Many economic transactions, including those of online markets, have a time lag between the start and end times
of transactions. Customers need to wait for completion of their transaction (order fulfillment) and hence are also
interested in their waiting time as a Quality of Service (QoS) attribute. So, they factor this QoS in the demand
they offer to the firm (service-provider) and some customers (user-set) would be willing to pay for shorter waiting
times. On the other hand, such waiting times depend on the demand user-set offers to the service-provider. We
model the above economic-QoS strategic interaction between service-provider and user-set under a fairly generic
scheduling framework as a non-cooperative constrained game.
We use an existing joint pricing and scheduling model. An optimal solution to this joint pricing and scheduling
problem was guaranteed by a finite step algorithm subject to a conjecture. We first settle this conjecture based on
queuing and optimization arguments and discuss its implications on the above game. We show that a continuum
of Nash equilibria (NE) exists and it can be computed easily using constrained best response dynamics. Revenue
maximal NE is identified by above finite step algorithm. We illustrate how both players can benefit at such revenue
maximal NE by identifying suitable operational decisions, i.e., by choosing an appropriate game along the theme
of pricing and revenue management.
Keywords: Pricing, revenue management, Nash equilibrium, best response dynamics, constraint game, priority
queues, QoS, finite step algorithm, service level agreements, convex optimization.
1 Introduction
Services and their Quality of Service (QoS) attribute form a major portion of web based Internet economy. The
offered services involve downloading/installation of an application software (app) and those where customers need
to wait for some amount of time for their request/transaction to be completed by the service-provider (firm). We
focus in a scenario where customers are willing to wait and apart from the price of the service, such customers are
also interested in their waiting time as a QoS attribute. Such economic activities have other interesting features; the
prominent being the finite resource capacity of the service-provider, the key reason why customers need to wait. Some
other consequences include pricing of such services, scheduling of these finite capacity resources, etc. Our theme is
the behavior of equilibria in markets where customers are sensitive to the price and service levels they receive which
is determined by suitably defined QoS measures.
Above strategic and economic interaction arises in many fundamental resource allocation problems. We mention
below two motivating examples. First one from the High Performance Computing (HPC) facility and another one
in an online retail sector. In such scenarios, customers’ requests form queues during their interactions with the
service-provider.
The HPC center at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) provides high-speed and large-scale com-
puter processing facility. The NREL HPC system is one of the largest HPC systems in the world dedicated to
advancing renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies [24]. The computing power of this high-end technology
being scarce, jobs are queued up and will be completed eventually. Users are charged certain price for using this facility.
However, users can reduce the queue waiting time by paying more to HPC facility. Jobs are given (non-preemptive
strict) priority if they pay twice the normal rate [25].
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Another motivating example is the online retail stores for fast moving consumer goods, electronic gadgets, durables,
etc., deliver goods within some pre-specified (standard) delivery time. Customers in many cases can pay a premium
charge in return for faster delivery time; we call this class of customers secondary class of customers while the primary
class of customers are those who choose to wait for longer time in return for no additional payments – primary class
because they usually form a large portion of the overall customer base. In such situations, the retail stores have to
carefully manage their finite resources like warehouses, logistics, etc. Note that such stores while quoting the extra
charge as well as the faster delivery time need to make sure that the goods are delivered to the primary customers within
the standard delivery time. Separate Service Level Agreements (SLAs) between the online store and two classes of
customers formalize such quoted (faster) delivery times and (extra) prices. Differential pricing and scheduling policies
of queues play crucial roles in such interactions. Also, mean waiting time for each class of customers is a suitable QoS
measure here.
We study a model of above strategic interaction in the presence of congestion. We consider HPC or the online
retail seller as service-provider or firm. We consider the setup wherein the firm is already offering service to some
existing (primary class of) customers, with a pre-specified price, arrival rate and service level as part of the service
level agreement, SLAp it has with this set of customers. The firm has some spare resource capacity after serving the
primary class of customers and is considering to offer this spare resource to another (secondary) class of customers,
which we call user-set. It intends to maximize its revenue rate from the secondary class of customers. We assume that
the primary customers offer a stable demand and they don’t switch to secondary class; this assumption is reasonable
at an aggregate level as there is always a certain portion of customers who are willing to wait rather than pay price
for faster delivery, i.e., we assume that there is a market segmentation. From the user-set point of view two important
aspects are the price of the service and the waiting time incurred. In fact, some customers will be willing to pay more
for this service to have lower mean waiting times. For example Amazon offers to Amazon Prime members with the
default free two-day delivery – it offers a small incentive (e.g., 1 digital credit) to a Prime member to opt for the
standard one-week delivery instead. The user-set intends to maximize the rate of customers that the firm is able to
offer this particular service.
Specifically, we consider the framework in which the mean demand the user-set offers to the service-provider is
negatively linear in the (extra) price and the mean waiting time of a typical customer – the linear demand setup
capturing the sensitivity of the user-set to the price and offered QoS level. The service-provider, for a given demand
distribution, has to decide on the price of the service as well as the mean waiting time it can guarantee to the user-set
constrained by the SLAp it already had with the primary class of customers. Note that the mean waiting time of
customers that the service-provider can guarantee depends on the mean demand that the user-set offers to it, which
in turn depends on the mean waiting time they are guaranteed; hence this interaction is strategic and the natural
question would be the existence of equilibrium. Further, the existing SLAp with the primary class of customers leads
to a constrained strategic interaction as illustrated in Figure 1. All notations of this figure are elaborated in Section
2.
Service-Provider
as a Queue
(Pricing and
operational decisions)
Price θ, Scheduling policy β and
Mean waiting time bound Ss
based on
demand with mean λs
Demand with mean λs
Price θ and Quality of Service Ss
User-set offers
demand with mean
λs ≤ a− bθ − cSs
(b and c are
demand elasticities)
Figure 1: Schematic view of service-provider (as a queue) and user-set (customers) interaction.
We model the above interaction under a fairly generic scheduling scheme, i.e., under the set of all non-preemptive,
non-anticipative and work conserving policies. We exploit the completeness feature of delay dependent priority (DDP)
scheme, introduced by Kleinrock [17], to pose the problem in an existing framework of a joint pricing and scheduling
model introduced in [26]. Completeness of a dynamic priority implies that it achieves all possible achievable vectors
of mean waiting time (obtained by any non pre-emptive, non anticipative and work conserving scheduling scheme) for
a suitable value of the priority parameter. See [21] and [4] for detailed discussion on completeness and [8], [9] for the
completeness feature of different dynamic priority scheduling schemes including delay dependent priority discipline.
An optimal solution to this joint pricing and scheduling problem was guaranteed by a finite step algorithm subject
to a conjecture (see [26]). We first settle this conjecture based on queuing and optimization arguments and discuss its
implications on a non-standard game for above strategic interaction.
We show that a continuum of Nash equilibria (NE) exists and it can be computed easily using constrained best
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response dynamics. The constrained best response dynamics indeed finds a NE in one step for a given game. Further,
revenue maximal NE in this continuum of NE is identified by above finite step algorithm. We illustrate with numerical
instances that both players can benefit at such revenue maximal NE by identifying suitable operational decisions, i.e.,
by choosing an appropriate game. Several interesting game theoretic issues are under investigation such as impact
of non-linear market in strategic interaction, intervention or mechanism design for the market so that the revenue
maximal NE is achieved. We now briefly present some important and related work in this field.
1.1 Related literature
In literature, Naor [22] was first to study the issues of pricing and congestion control in an observable M/M/1/FCFS
queue. A huge literature has evolved since then. A comprehensive survey on topics related to queue pricing can be
seen in [12] and [14]. A similar model where a resource is shared by two different classes of customers is studied in [11].
This model assumes that the demand is sensitive to unit price alone and focuses on dynamic pricing policies which
depend on the production system (queue) status. A related model of optimal pricing with pre-emptive scheduling
has been recently analyzed in [10]. On the other hand, the study of equilibrium behaviour of customers and servers
in queueing system has long history and researchers have developed a broad literature in this field by now (see
[3, 6, 12, 13, 14, 15, 23] and references there in). In above literature, often customers (or customer classes) are
considered as player whereas we consider market as a player by aggregating all customers into a market segment.
The delay dependent priority queue has been recently called as accumulating priority queue and analysis is advanced
to obtain the distribution of waiting time (see [19], [28]). Also related to accumulating priority queue, the issues of
pricing has been dealt with in [16] and scheduling in [18]. Pricing problem in [16] is formulated as a non-cooperative
game in which customers purchase priority coefficients with the goal of reducing waiting costs in exchange. It is argued
that if waiting costs are linear then the Nash equilibrium is in pure strategies. Authors in [18] deal with the scheduling
of multi-class multi-server queue where a job is scheduled with one of the idle server using r-dispatch policy introduced
in [7]. Clearly, these settings are different from this paper.
2 System Description
The model addresses the question of pricing the surplus server capacity of a stable M/G/1 queue for a new class
of customers that is sensitive to its QoS (mean waiting time) and price. The primary class of customers arrive
according to Poisson arrival process with rate λp. Sp, the desired guarantee (or bound) on the mean waiting time of
the primary class of customers, indicates the service level offered. The service time of customers is independent and
identically distributed with mean 1/µ and variance σ2, irrespective of customer class. A schematic view of the model
is shown in Figure 2. The objective is to determine the promised bound on the mean waiting time of a secondary
class of customers, Ss and their unit admission price θ so as to maximize the revenue generated by the system, while
constrained by primary class service levels. The secondary class of customers arrive according to an independent
Poisson arrival process with rate λs, which is linearly dependent on price θ and QoS Ss: λs(θ, Ss) = a − bθ − cSs,
where a, b, c are positive constants driven by the market; a is the maximal arrival rate offered by market, b and c are
the elasticity of unit price and assured service level respectively.
Before describing the model, we motivate two important assumptions of our system setup. First, that of linear
demand function. We assume linear relationship for simplicity of analysis and it has been previously used in queuing
literature (see, for example [5], [20] and comprehensive references for the subsequent work in [12]). Linear production
functions are also often used in economics literature [1]. Our another assumption is related to the fact that queue
operator cannot optimize the primary class and customers cannot switch between classes. We list below few instances
where such model is relevant.
One such model is where primary customers are inhouse customers of a firm and hence their arrival rate cannot be
controlled (optimized). Suppose the firm observes that some of its capacity and investment is underutilized and that
there is a market for its capacity and capability. Thus, the firm can ‘lease its facilities’ to secondary customers without
affecting the service level of existing/primary (inhouse) customers. Primary customers are inhouse customers of service
provider and they sign a long term contract of receiving service at pre-specified service level. These customers are not
allowed to break the contract and participate in new service level offered and price charged by service provider. Hence
switches between classes is not possible.
We explain the above behavior in the context of mobile network operators. In United States, the major network
operators as of now are AT&T, Sprint, T-Mobile and Verizon (see [31]). These are the big four and they offer their
own mobile phone plans and contracts and have a primary customer base. There are virtual operators who lease the
service from these big four and have customers of their own. For example, Boost Mobile has customers of its own,
but it uses the Sprint network. In such situations, above joint pricing and scheduling model gives a guideline to price
3
virtual operator’s customers. Other firms could be a container depot, a large manufacturing plant, etc. where long
term contracts are feasible and above pricing model is relevant. In above examples, customers can’t change their class.
Such assumptions have also been previously used in literature (see [10], [26] and references therein). However, example
of the models where customers are allowed to change classes are DiffServ model (see [30]).
Let F be the set of all non pre-emptive, non anticipative and work conserving scheduling schemes. The mean
waiting time of primary and secondary class customers depend on the scheduling scheme pi ∈ F . Let Wp(λs, pi) and
Ws(λs, pi) be the mean waiting times of primary and secondary customers, when the arrival rate of secondary jobs
is λs and scheduling policy is pi ∈ F . Now, select a suitable pair of pricing parameters θ and Ss for the secondary
class customers, a queue scheduling policy pi ∈ F and an appropriate admission rate for the secondary class customers
λs, that will maximize the expected revenue from their inclusion, while ensuring that the mean waiting time to the
primary class customers does not exceed a given quantity Sp. Thus, the revenue maximization problem, P, is:
P: max
λs,pi,Ss,θ
θλs (1)
Subject to : Wp(λs, pi) ≤ Sp, (2)
Ws(λs, pi) ≤ Ss, (3)
λs ≤ µ− λp, (4)
λs ≤ a− bθ − cSs, (5)
λs, θ, Ss ≥ 0, pi ∈ F . (6)
Constraint (2) and (3) ensure the service level for the jobs of primary and secondary class respectively. Constraint (4)
is queue stability constraint. Note that the constraint (4) will remain non-binding at the optimal solution to ensure
finite QoS (mean waiting time) levels for both classes of customers. Constraint (5) ensures that the mean arrival rate
of secondary class customers should not exceed the demand generated by charged price θ and offered service level Ss.
It is common in literature to assume that demand for service is sensitive to price and the expected delay (see, for
example [5], [20] and comprehensive references for the subsequent work in [12]). If one assumes such demand, i.e.,
λs(θ, pi) = a − bθ − cWs(λs, pi), then constraint (3) is tight and P1 gives the optimal pricing and priority regime for
this demand function. So the results of this paper also provide conditions for the optimal solutions of both demand
models to coincide.
QoS and price sensitive demand
µ
Primary demand
Optimal
Scheduler
Figure 2: Schematic view of the model
Delay dependent priority queue discipline is identified as a complete class of schedulers for mean waiting time
performance measure in [8]. Completeness of a scheduling discipline implies that all possible vectors of mean waiting
time under any non pre-emptive, non anticipative and work conserving policy can be achieved by suitably chosen
parameter from a complete scheduling discipline. Thus, optimizing over pi ∈ F is equivalent to the optimization over
DDP scheme. We now briefly explain the mechanism of DDP.
In DDP scheme, customers are scheduled according to their delay in queue. Mathematically, the instantaneous
priority at time t of class c customer that arrived at time Tc is calculated as qc(t) := (t−Tc)bc for some positive weight
bc associated with class c. Let c ∈ {p, s} so that bp and bs refer to the weights associated with primary and secondary
classes, respectively. At each service completion, the server chooses the next job with the highest instantaneous
priority qc(·), c ∈ {p, s}. The steady state mean waiting time of each class of customers, derived by Kleinrock [17],
depends on the ratio of weights (bi) given to each class. Let β := bs/bp. Note that β = 0 corresponds to static high
priority to primary class customers, β = 1 is the global First Come First Serve (FCFS) queuing discipline across
classes and β = ∞ corresponds to static high priority to secondary class customers. Let Wp(λs, β) and Ws(λs, β) be
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the mean waiting times of primary and secondary customers, when the arrival rate of secondary jobs is λs and queue
management parameter is β.
In the view of completeness of DDP, the revenue maximization problem, P, can be equivalently written as:
P0: max
λs,β,Ss,θ
θλs (7)
Subject to : Wp(λs, β) ≤ Sp, (8)
Ws(λs, β) ≤ Ss, (9)
λs ≤ µ− λp, (10)
λs ≤ a− bθ − cSs, (11)
λs, θ, Ss ≥ 0, β ∈ {R+ ∪∞}. (12)
Optimal solution to problem P0 is characterized in [26]. The non-convex problem P0 can be presented as following
non-convex constrained optimization problem P1 (since constraints (9) and (11) are binding at optimality [26])
P1: max
λs,β
1
b
(
aλs − λ2s − cλsWs(λs, β)
)
(13)
Subject to : Wp(λs, β) ≤ Sp, (14)
λs ≤ µ− λp, (15)
λs, β ≥ 0. (16)
Once the optimal secondary class mean arrival rate λ∗s and the optimal queue discipline management parameter β
∗ are
obtained, the optimal admission price θ∗ and the optimal assured service level to secondary class S∗s can be computed
using S∗s = Ws(λ
∗
s, β
∗) and λ∗s = a− bθ∗ − cS∗s .
Note that above optimization problem P1 considers only finite values of β, though β =∞ is also a valid decision
variable as it corresponds to a static high priority to secondary class customers. Hence, the following one dimensional
convex optimization problem, P2, wherein β is set to ∞ in problem P1, is:
P2: max
λs
1
b
[aλs − λ2s − cλsW˜s(λs)] (17)
Subject to : W˜p(λs) ≤ Sp, (18)
λs ≤ µ− λp, (19)
λs ≥ 0. (20)
where W˜p(λs) = Wp(λs, β = ∞) and W˜s(λs) = Ws(λs, β = ∞). Above two optimization problems (P1 and P2) are
analyzed for their global optima, and their optimal values are compared in [26] to give a solution to P0 via a finite
step algorithm. The optimal solutions of P1 and P2 are derived using Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions.
0 Sˆp Il
IFCFS
Iu
Sp
∞
I− I
P1 feasibility
P2 feasibility
Infeasibility
Range
Figure 3: Illustration for range of Sp with optimal solutions coming from problem P1 and P2
Solution of these optimization problems are obtained in terms of different ranges of primary class service levels
(Sp). For service level Sp ≤ Sˆp = λpψ
µ(µ− λp) , the problems are infeasible (no secondary class customers can be
accommodated) because the promised bound for primary customers cannot be achieved, even without considering
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secondary customer. If
a
c
>
λp(2µ− λp)
µ(µ− λp)2 ψ where ψ =
1 + σ2µ2
2
then both the optimization problems P1 and P2
have (global) optimal solutions for Sp ∈ I− ∪ I (see Figure 3), for suitably identified finite intervals I− ≡ (Sˆp, Il) and
I ≡ [Il, Iu) (see Theorem 1 and 2 in [26]) where Il and Iu are:
Il =
λ1ψ
µ(µ− λp) and Iu =
λ1ψ
(µ− λ(1)s )(µ− λ1)
(21)
Here λ1 = λp + λ
(1)
s and λ
(1)
s is the unique root of cubic G(λs) in interval (0, µ− λp) where G(λs) is
2µλ3s − [cψ + µ(a+ 4φ0)]λ2s + 2φ0[cψ + µ(a+ φ0)]λs − aµφ20 + cψλp(µ+ φ0),
with φ0 = µ−λp. It follows from above definition of Il and Iu that Sˆp < Il < Iu and hence service level ranges I− and
I are non-empty intervals. Problem P1 is undefined1 for service level range Sp ≥ Iu whereas both problems P1 and
P2 are feasible for Sp ∈ I− ∪ I. Hence, one has to compare the optimal objectives of problem P1 and P2 to obtain the
global optima of problem P0 in service level range I− ∪ I. It was proved in [26] that for Sp ∈ I, the optimal solution
of P0 is given by P1, i.e., the optimal objective of P1, O∗1 , is more than that of P2, O
∗
2 , for Sp ∈ I. Further, based on
computational evidences, following result was conjectured in [26].
Conjecture ([26]). For Sp ∈ I−, the optimal solution of P0 is given by optimal solution of P1.
We elaborate on the statement of above conjecture and comment that the conjecture cannot be settled straight
forwardly. Mathematically, the conjecture states that O∗1 > O
∗
2 for Sp ∈ I−. Note that this comparison is not straight
Sˆp Il Iu
Sp
O1∗ or O2∗
O∗1(λ
(1)
s , β(1))
O∗1(λ
(2)
s , 0)
I− I
O∗2(λ
(4)
s , β =∞)
Figure 4: Contradiction from the concavity of O∗2 as derived in Theorem 1
forward due to the non-linear dependence of the two objective functions2, O∗1 in Equation (13) and O
∗
2 in Equation
(17) on λs and β which are in turn impacted by the value of Sp in the interval of interest I
−. We present a complete
proof for this conjecture and discuss its implications in subsequent section.
3 A Proof of Conjecture and finite step algorithm
First, we prove few claims which are useful in obtaining the geometric structure (concavity) of O∗2 . Such geometric
structure is stated and proved in Theorem 1. The conjecture is proved by contradiction in Theorem 2 by exploiting
Theorem 1.
1 Note that problem P1 is defined for any non-negative but finite β. As Sp ↑ Iu, β ↑ ∞. Thus, problem P1 is undefined for Sp ≥ Iu.
2One can possibly push the arguments for optimal objective of problem P1 being more than that of P2 in a small range around Il within
I−. Note that optimal objective of problem P1 is strictly more than that of P2 at Sp = Il (see [26]). Thus, by continuity, the optimal
objective of problem P2 continues to be strictly lesser than that of P1 for some small range  > 0 of Sp when Sp ∈ (Il − , Il]. But this
leaves the possibility of the optimal objective of P2 being more than that of P1 beyond this small range, i.e., for Sp ∈ (Sˆp, Il− ]. Thus, in
the process, optimal objective of problem P2 will then be non-concave as in Figure 4. Our concavity arguments (in Theorem 1) preclude
such a possibility (see Theorem 2).
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Claim 1. λ
(3)
s > λ
(1)
s , where λ
(3)
s and λ
(1)
s are the unique roots of cubics G˜(λs) and G(λs) respectively in the interval
(0, µ− λp) with G(λs) as:
2µλ3s − [cψ + µ(a+ 4φ0)]λ2s + 2φ0[cψ + µ(a+ φ0)]λs − aµφ20 + cψλp(µ+ φ0) (22)
G˜(λs) = 2µλ
3
s − [aµ+ cψ + 4µ2]λ2s + 2µ[aµ+ cψ + µ2]λs − µ[aµ2 − cψλp] (23)
and φ0 = µ− λp.
Proof. λ
(1)
s is the unique root of cubic G(λs) in the interval (0, µ − λp) whenever a
c
>
λp(2µ− λp)
µ(µ− λp)2 ψ [26, Theorem
1]. Hence, λ
(1)
s ∈ (0, µ− λp) for a ∈ (al,∞) where al = λp(2µ− λp)
µ(µ− λp)2 cψ. λ
(3)
s is the unique root of cubic G˜(λs) in the
interval (0, µ − λp) whenever µ− λp
µλp
>
aλp − cψ
2µλ2p + cψ(µ+ λp)
and
a
c
>
λp
µ2
ψ [26, Theorem 3]. Hence, λ
(3)
s ∈ (0, µ − λp)
for a ∈ (a˜l, a˜u) where a˜l = λp
µ2
cψ and a˜u = 2(µ−λp)+ cψ
λp
[
1 +
µ2 − λ2p
µλp
]
. If
µ− λp
µλp
≤ aλp − cψ
2µλ2p + cψ(µ+ λp)
, i.e., a ≥ a˜u
then G˜(µ − λp) ≤ 0 and G˜(0) < 0 hold by the definition of cubic G˜(.) and a > a˜l. Hence, it follows from Claim 3 in
[27] that µ− λp ≤ λ(3)s < µ. It follows that a˜l = λp
µ2
cψ <
λp(2µ− λp)
µ(µ− λp)2 cψ = al. Note that G(0), G˜(0) and G˜(µ− λp)
is 0 at a = al, a˜l and a˜u respectively. Hence, λ
(1)
s = 0, λ
(3)
s = 0 and λ
(3)
s = µ − λp at a = al, a˜l and a˜u respectively.
Note that a < a˜l results in infeasible solution (See [26, Theorem 1-4]).
Figure 5: G(λs) vs λs in range (0, µ − λp) at
a = al
Figure 6: G˜(λs) vs λs in range (0, µ − λp) at
a = al
On the basis of relative values for al, a˜l and a˜u and using the fact that λ
(1)
s and λ
(3)
s are increasing functions of a
[27, claim 5, page 24], we have:
• If al < a˜u, then,
1. λ
(1)
s ≤ 0 and 0 < λ(3)s < µ− λp for a ∈ (a˜l, al]
2. 0 < λ
(1)
s < µ− λp and 0 < λ(3)s < µ− λp for a ∈ (al, a˜u)
3. 0 < λ
(1)
s < µ− λp and µ− λp ≤ λ(3)s < µ for a ≥ a˜u
• If al ≥ a˜u, then,
1. λ
(1)
s < 0 and 0 < λ
(3)
s < µ− λp for a ∈ (a˜l, a˜u)
2. λ
(1)
s ≤ 0 and µ− λp ≤ λ(3)s < µ for a ∈ [a˜u, al]
3. 0 < λ
(1)
s < µ− λp and µ− λp < λ(3)s < µ for a > al
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Hence, λ
(3)
s > λ
(1)
s for all cases except the case when al < a˜u and a ∈ (al, a˜u). Note that G(λs) and G˜(λs) have
exactly one root in interval (0, µ−λp). Root of G(λs), λ(1)s , is 0 at a = al and G(λs) increases in the interval (0, µ−λp).
Root of G˜(λs), λ
(3)
s , is zero at a = a˜l < al and λ
(3)
s is an increasing function of a. So λ
(3)
s > λ
(1)
s at a = al. Plots of
G(λs) and G˜(λs) are shown in Figure 5 and 6 respectively.
As
∂G(λs)
∂a
= −µ(µ−λp−λs)2 and ∂G˜(λs)
∂a
= −µ(µ−λs)2, G(λs) and G˜(λs) are decreasing functions of a. Since
G˜(λs) decreases with higher rate than G(λs), λ
(3)
s will increase with higher rate than λ
(1)
s . Hence, λ
(3)
s > λ
(1)
s holds
for a ∈ (al, a˜u) also and the claim follows.
The optimal solution of problem P1 is described in terms of primary class service level range I and I− (see Theorem
1 and 2 in [26]), while the optimal solution of problem P2 is given by Theorem 3 and 4 of [26] in terms of service level
range J and J−. From Theorem 3 and 4 of [26], it is clear that if µ−λpµλp ≤
aλp−cψ
2µλ2p+cψ(µ+λp)
then J− = (Sˆp,∞) and
J = φ otherwise J− = (Sˆp, Jl] and J = (Jl,∞) where Jl = ψλ3
(µ−λ(3)s )(µ−λ3)
(see Figure 7 for graphical illustration). We
present the following claim that relates I and I− with the range J and J−. Claim 1 is exploited in proving following
Claim 2.
0 Sˆp Il
IFCFS
Iu Jl
Sp
∞
I− I
J− J
J− If
µ− λp
µλp
≤ aλp − cψ
2µλ2p + cψ(µ+ λp)
If
µ− λp
µλp
>
aλp − cψ
2µλ2p + cψ(µ+ λp)
Figure 7: Relation among intervals of Sp
Claim 2. Range I− ∪ I is contained in J−, i.e., I− ∪ I ⊂ J−.
Proof. The solution of optimization problem P2 is given by Theorem 3 and 4 of [26] in terms of the service level range
J and J− (see Figure 7). So, the entire feasible range of service level (Sˆp,∞) is divided in interval J− ∪ J as shown
in Figure 7.
From Theorem 3 and 4 of [26], it is clear that if
µ− λp
µλp
≤ aλp − cψ
2µλ2p + cψ(µ+ λp)
then J− = (Sˆp,∞) and J = φ
otherwise J− = (Sˆp, Jl] and J = (Jl,∞) where Jl = ψλ3
(µ− λ(3)s )(µ− λ3)
and Sˆp =
ψλp
µ(µ− λp) . Now, consider the
following two cases to prove the claim:
Case 1: When
µ− λp
µλp
≤ aλp − cψ
2µλ2p + cψ(µ+ λp)
Interval J− becomes (Sˆp,∞) under the condition of this case as discussed above. Since lower and upper limit of I−∪I
are Sˆp and Iu respectively, these limits are finite (see [26]). Hence, I
− ∪ I ⊂ J− holds.
Case 2: When
µ− λp
µλp
>
aλp − cψ
2µλ2p + cψ(µ+ λp)
In this case, J− = (Sˆp, Jl] where Jl =
ψλ3
(µ− λ(3)s )(µ− λ3)
and I− ∪ I = (Sˆp, Iu) where Iu = ψλ1
(µ−λ(1)s )(µ−λ1)
and by
definition λ1 = λp +λ
(1)
s , λ3 = λp +λ
(3)
s . Note that, Iu = ξ(λ
(1)
s ) and Jl = ξ(λ
(3)
s ) where ξ(λs) =
ψλ
(µ− λs)(µ− λ) and
λ = λp+λs. On computing partial derivative of ξ(λs) with respect to λs, we get
∂ξ(λs)
∂λs
=
ψ(µ(µ− λs) + λ(µ− λ))
(µ− λs)2(µ− λ)2 >
0, i.e., ξ(λs) is an increasing function of λs. So, ξ(λ
(3)
s ) > ξ(λ
(1)
s ) iff λ
(3)
s > λ
(1)
s , But λ
(3)
s > λ
(1)
s follows from claim
1. Thus, ξ(λ
(3)
s ) > ξ(λ
(1)
s ) follows and equivalently Jl > Iu holds. Hence I
− ∪ I ⊂ J− holds in this case too, and the
claim follows.
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It follows from Claim 2 that the nature of the optimal objective of problem P2 in service level range I− ∪ I can be
identified by finding the same in service level range J−. Such nature (concave increasing) of the objective function is
identified in the following theorem and will be useful in proving the conjecture.
Theorem 3.1. The optimal objective function for problem P2, i.e., O∗2 is increasing concave in service level range
I− ∪ I, while the optimal objective function for problem P1, O∗1, is increasing concave in I− and linearly increasing in
I.
Proof. It is shown in [26] that O∗1 is increasing concave in I
− and linearly increasing in I, we give details here for its
completeness. The optimal objective of problem P1 and P2 are given by O∗1 and O
∗
2 , and the corresponding optimal
solutions are given by (λfs , β
f ) and (λis,∞), respectively. Superscript ‘f ’ and ‘i’ denote solution corresponding to finite
and infinite β. In case of finite β, solution is given by Theorem 1 and 2 in [26], for Sp ∈ I− ∪ I. Hence, the waiting
time constraint is binding (Wp(λs, β) ≤ Sp) from statement of these theorems.
In case of infinite β, the solution is given by Theorem 4 in [26], for Sp ∈ I−∪I as I−∪I ⊂ J− (Claim 2). It follows
from Theorem 4 in [26] that the primary class customer’s waiting time constraint is binding. Therefore, waiting time
constraint Wp(λs, β) ≤ Sp is always binding for Sp ∈ I−∪ I irrespective of nature of optimal solution (finite or infinite
β). By using the interpretation of Lagrange multiplier (Proposition 3.3.3 in [2, page 315] and [27, page 25]), we have
∂O∗1
∂Sp
= −uf1 and
∂O∗2
∂Sp
= −vi1 (24)
where uf1 and v
i
1 are the corresponding values of the Lagrangian multipliers associated with the constraint Wp(λs, β) =
Sp of the optimization problems P1 and P2 respectively. As defined in [27, page 25]:
uf1 =
(µ− λp)G(λfs )
bψ(µ− λp − λfs )2
− cλp
b
and (25)
vi1 =
(µ− λp − λis)2G˜(λis)
bψµ[µ(µ+ λp)− (λp + λis)2]
(26)
Now, we look for the sign of vi1 and u
f
1 in service level range I
− ∪ I to study the nature of the optimal objective
function.
The optimal objective of optimization problem P2, i.e., O∗2 is given by Theorem 4 of [26] for service level range
Sp ∈ I− ∪ I as I− ∪ I ⊂ J−. λ(4)s is the optimal admission rate for secondary class customers in Theorem 4. Hence,
λis = λ
(4)
s . Sign of vi1 is decided by G˜(λ
i
s). λ
(3)
s is the root of cubic G˜(λs) as discussed in Claim 1. It follows that
λ
(4)
s < λ
(3)
s (see proof of Theorem 4 in [27]). We note that G˜(λs) is negative and increasing in interval [0, λ
(3)
s ]. So,
G˜(λis) = G˜(λ
(4)
s ) ≤ G˜(λ(3)s ) = 0 and hence vi1 ≤ 0 for Sp ∈ I− ∪ I. Now, it follows from Equation (24) that
∂O∗2
∂Sp
≥ 0.
The solution of optimization problem P1 is given by Theorem 1 of [26] for Sp ∈ I with λ(1)s as the optimal
admission rate for secondary class customers. Hence, λfs = λ
(1)
s . λ
(1)
s is the root of cubic G(λs). From Equation (25),
uf1 =
−cλp
b
≤ 0 for Sp ∈ I.
Solution of problem P1 is given by Theorem 2 of [26] for Sp ∈ I− with λ(2)s = µ(µ− λp)Sp
ψ
− λp as the optimal
admission rate for secondary class customers. Hence, λfs = λ
(2)
s . Note that λ
(2)
s linearly increases with Sp and
λ
(2)
s = λ
(1)
s at Sp =
ψ(λp + λ
(1)
s )
µ(µ− λp) = Il, the upper limit of interval I
−. Thus, λ(2)s < λ
(1)
s for Sp ∈ I− ≡ (Sˆp, Il). G(λs)
is an increasing function of λs ∈ (0, λ(1)s ) (see proof of claim 1 in [27]). This implies that G(λ(2)s ) ≤ G(λ(1)s ) = 0. From
Equation (25), uf1 ≤ 0 for Sp ∈ I−.
Thus uf1 ≤ 0 for Sp ∈ I− ∪ I and we get the following from Equation (24):
∂O∗1
∂Sp
≥ 0 and ∂O
∗
2
∂Sp
≥ 0 (27)
Thus, O∗1 and O
∗
2 are increasing functions of Sp, in the interval I
− ∪ I. Partial derivatives of Lagrangian multipliers
with respect to λfs and λ
i
s are shown to be positive [27, page 25]:
∂uf1
∂λfs
≥ 0 and ∂v
i
1
∂λis
≥ 0 (28)
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From Equation (24):
∂2O∗1
∂S2p
= −∂u
f
1
∂Sp
= −∂u
f
1
∂λfs
∂λfs
∂Sp
(29)
Corollary 1 in [26] states that the mean arrival rate of secondary class customers λ
(1)
s is independent of Sp in interval
I, so,
∂λ
(1)
s
∂Sp
= 0. But for Sp ∈ I, λfs = λ(1)s and hence we have
∂2O∗1
∂S2p
= 0 (30)
Consider Corollary 2 in [26] which states that the mean arrival rate of secondary class customers λ
(2)
s is linearly
increasing function of Sp in interval I
−, i.e.,
∂λ
(2)
s
∂Sp
> 0. But for Sp ∈ I−, λfs = λ(2)s and we get the following from
Equation (29),
∂2O∗1
∂S2p
≤ 0 (31)
By using equations (27), (30) and (31), we can say that O∗1 is a linearly increasing function of Sp, in the interval
I, while it is an increasing concave function of Sp in the interval I
−. For Sp ∈ I− ∪ I with β as infinity, solution
of problem P2 is given by Theorem 4 of [26] with λ
(4)
s as the optimal admission rate for secondary class customers.
Hence, λis = λ
(4)
s . From Equation (24), we have
∂2O∗2
∂S2p
= − ∂v
i
1
∂Sp
= −∂v
i
1
∂λis
∂λis
∂Sp
(32)
Consider Corollary 3 in [26] which states that λ
(4)
s is an increasing function of Sp in the interval J
−. Since I−∪I ⊂ J−,
∂λis
∂Sp
≥ 0 for Sp ∈ I− ∪ I. So from equation (28) and (32), we have
∂2O∗2
∂S2p
≤ 0 for Sp ∈ I− ∪ I (33)
O∗2 is, thus, an increasing function of Sp as
∂O∗2
∂Sp
≥ 0 and concave as ∂
2O∗2
∂S2p
≤ 0 for Sp ∈ I− ∪ I. Hence, the theorem
follows.
Sˆp Il Iu
Sp
O∗1 or O
∗
2
O∗1(λ
(1)
s , β(1))
O∗1(λ
(2)
s , 0)
I− I
O∗2(λ
(4)
s , β =∞)
Figure 8: No contradiction: this is the only fea-
sible scenario and conjecture follows from the
fact that O∗2 is smaller than O
∗
1 for Sp ∈ I−
O∗1 or O
∗
2
Sp
Sˆp Il Iu
I− I
O∗1(λ
(2)
s , 0)
O∗2(λ
(4)
s , β =∞)
O∗1(λ
(1)
s , β(1))
Figure 9: Slope of O∗2 is higher than that of
O∗1 near Sˆp but both the slopes are positive.
Contradiction by O∗2(λ
i
s,∞) < O∗1(λfs , βf ) at
Sˆp + 
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The optimal objective of problem P1 is more than that of P2 for Sp ∈ I, i.e., O∗1(λfs , βf ) > O∗2(λis, βi) (see [27,
page 26]). Thus, the optimal solution of P0 is given by that of P1 for Sp ∈ I. The concave increasing nature of O∗2
ensures that O∗2 cannot cross O
∗
1 more than once as this results in a non-concave function (See figure 4, O
∗
1 and O
∗
2
are in black and blue colors respectively in all subsequent figures).
The following (Theorem 2) result determines the nature of the optimal objective of problem P0 in service level
range I− by exploiting the increasing concave nature of optimal objective function of problem P2 as identified in
Theorem 1. The conjecture follows from Theorem 2.
Theorem 3.2. The optimal solution of P0 is given by the optimal solution of P1 for Sp ∈ I−.
Proof. The optimal objective of problem P1, O∗1 , is increasing concave in I
− and linearly increasing in I as stated in
Theorem 1; O∗2 cannot cross O
∗
1 more than once to ensure concavity as discussed above. Thus, four scenarios can arise
for optimal objective of problem P2, O∗2 , for service level range I
− as shown in Figures 8, 9, 10, and 11 depending on
the slope of O∗1 and O
∗
2 near Sˆp.
Sˆp Il Iu
Sp
O∗1 or O
∗
2
O∗1(λ
(1)
s , β(1))
O∗1(λ
(2)
s , 0)
I− I
O∗2(λ
(4)
s , β =∞)
Figure 10: Slope of O∗2 is negative and higher
than that of O∗1 near Sˆp. Contradiction by in-
feasibility of O∗1 (equivalently problem P1) for
Sp < Sˆp.
Sˆp Il Iu
Sp
O∗1 or O
∗
2
O∗1(λ
(1)
s , β(1))
O∗1(λ
(2)
s , 0)
I− I
O∗2(λ
(4)
s , β =∞)
Figure 11: Contradiction by the fact that
O∗2(λ
i
s,∞) < O∗1(λfs , βf ) for Sp ∈ I
In Figure 9, slope of O∗2 is higher than that of O
∗
1 near Sˆp. But such a scenario is not possible by the fact that
O∗2(λ
i
s,∞) < O∗1(λfs , βf ) at Sˆp + , where  is a small positive number [27, page 26]. Figure 10 has the negative slope
for O∗2 near Sˆp and this scenario is not possible as it contradicts the feasibility requirements (i.e. Sp ≥ Sˆp); and the
Figure 11 is also not possible as it contradicts the fact that optimal objective of problem P1 is more than that of P2
for Sp ∈ I, i.e., O∗1(λfs , βf ) > O∗2(λis, βi) (see [27, page 26]). Thus, the only possibility is Figure 8 where the slope of
O∗2 is less than O
∗
1 near Sˆp and hence O
∗
2(λ
i
s,∞) < O∗1(λfs , βf ) for Sp ∈ I−. And the theorem follows.
We now discuss the implications of this conjecture on a finite step algorithm to compute the optimal solution for
problem P0.
3.1 Validity of algorithm
Since the conjecture is indeed true, it validates the finite step algorithm of [26] to compute the optimal operating
parameters for optimization problem P0. We briefly outline the algorithm below and reproduce the same.
The input parameters for the algorithm are λp, µ, σ, a, b, c and the promised QoS level for primary class customers
Sp. The algorithm accounts for the solution of problem P0 based on the range of Sp. If the value of Sp is smaller than
the given threshold Sˆp, the algorithm results into in-feasible solution in Step 2. Otherwise, it appropriately computes
the optimal arrival rate for secondary class customers (λ∗s) and the optimal scheduling parameter (β
∗) in steps 3-6.
Finally, algorithm finds the optimal price (θ∗) and the service level for secondary class customers (S∗s ) in Step 7. This
algorithm is used to compute the revenue maximal NE in a non-cooperative game between service-provider and the
user-set as discussed in Section 4.
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Algorithm 1 Finite step algorithm for solving problem P0
Require: λp, µ, σ, a, b, c and Sp
1: Define ψ =
[
1 + σ2µ2
]
/2.
2: If either Sp ≤ Sˆp ≡ λpψ
µ [µ− λp] or
a
c
≤ λp
µ2
ψ, then there does not exist a feasible solution. Assign λ∗s = 0 and Stop.
Else, go to the Step 3.
3: If
µ− λp
µλp
≤ aλp − cψ
2µλ2p + cψ(µ+ λp)
, then assign J` = ∞ and go to the Step 4. Else, find λ(3)s the unique root of the
cubic G˜(λs) which lies in the interval (0, µ− λp) where G˜(λs) is
2µλ3s −
[
aµ+ cψ + 4µ2
]
λ2s + 2µ
[
aµ+ cψ + µ2
]
λs − µ
[
aµ2 − cψλp
]
.
Calculate J` =
ψλ3
[µ−λ(3)s ][µ−λ3]
and define an interval J = (J`,∞) where λ3 = λp + λ(3)s . If Sp ∈ J , then assign
λ∗s = λ
(3)
s , β∗ =∞ and directly go to Step 7. Else, go to the Step 4.
4: If
a
c
≤ λp (2µ− λp)
µ (µ− λp)2
ψ, then define an interval J− = (Sˆp, J`] when J` is finite otherwise take J− = (Sˆp,∞). Assign
λ∗s =
1
2Sp
[
Sp [2µ− λp] + ψ −
√
[Spλp + ψ]
2
+ 4µψSp
]
, β∗ = ∞ for Sp ∈ J− and directly go to Step 7. Else, go
to the Step 5.
5: Find λ(1)s , the unique root of the cubic G(λs) in the interval (0, µ− λp) with φ0 = µ− λp and G(λs) =
2µλ3s − [cψ + µ(a+ 4φ0)]λ2s + 2φ0[cψ + µ(a+ φ0)]λs − aµφ20 + cψλp(µ+ φ0).
Calculate I` =
ψλ1
µ[µ−λp] and Iu =
ψλ1
[µ−λ(1)s ][µ−λ1]
where λ1 = λp + λ
(1)
s .
6: Find λ(1)s , the unique root of the cubic G(λs) in the interval (0, µ− λp) with φ0 = µ− λp and G(λs) =
2µλ3s − [cψ + µ(a+ 4φ0)]λ2s + 2φ0[cψ + µ(a+ φ0)]λs − aµφ20 + cψλp(µ+ φ0).
Calculate I` =
ψλ1
µ[µ−λp] and Iu =
ψλ1
[µ−λ(1)s ][µ−λ1]
where λ1 = λp + λ
(1)
s .
7: Define intervals: I− = (Sˆp, I`), I = [I`, Iu) and I+ = [Iu, J`] when J` is finite, otherwise take I+ as I+ = [Iu,∞).
(i) If Sp ∈ I−, then assign λ∗s = µ[µ−λp]Spψ − λp and β∗ = 0
(ii) If Sp ∈ I, then assign λ∗s = λ(1)s and
β∗ =

[µ− λ1][µSp[µ− λp]− ψλ1]
ψλ21 − µSpλp[µ− λ1]
for ψλ1µ[µ−λp] ≤ Sp ≤
ψλ1
µ[µ−λ1]
Spλ
(1)
s [µ− λ1]
ψλ1 − Sp[µ− λ(1)s ][µ− λ1]
for ψλ1µ[µ−λ1] < Sp <
ψλ1
[µ−λ(1)s ][µ−λ1]
(iii) If Sp ∈ I+, then assign λ∗s =
1
2Sp
[
Sp [2µ− λp] + ψ −
√
[Spλp + ψ]
2
+ 4µψSp
]
and β∗ =∞.
8: If given problem is feasible, the optimum assured service level to the secondary class customers is S∗s = Ws(λ
∗
s, β
∗)
and the optimal unit price charged to the secondary class customers is θ∗ = [a− cS∗s − λ∗s] /b.
12
3.2 Unique Solution of Problem P0
We argue below that (λ∗s, θ
∗, S∗s , β
∗) is the unique solution of optimization problem P0. Once the optimal secondary
class mean arrival rate λ∗s and queue discipline management parameter β
∗ are calculated from finite step algorithm,
the optimal admission price θ∗ and assured service level to secondary class S∗s can be computed (see [26]):
S∗s = Ws(λ
∗
s, β
∗) and θ∗ = [a− cS∗ − λ∗s]/b
Thus, uniqueness of λ∗s and β
∗ will suffice for unique solution of optimization problem P0. λ∗s and β
∗ are given by
Theorem 1, 2, 3 or 4 in [26]. Note that β∗ is either 0 or ∞ or a unique root of cubic polynomials in the interval
[0, µ− λp) depending on the value of service level Sp. And λ∗s is either a unique root of cubic (see Theorem 1 or 3 in
[26]) or a unique expression for given service level Sp (see Theorem 2 or 4 in [26]). Hence, λ
∗
s and β
∗ are unique and
so is the solution of problem P0.
4 Service-provider and user-set strategic interaction
We first present the details of non-cooperative game between service provider and the user-set. We further discuss
the existence of the continuum of NE and its computation via constrained best response dynamics. We remark that
the revenue maximal NE is identified by above finite step algorithm in this continuum of NE. We also illustrate with
numerical examples that both players can benefit at such revenue maximal NE by identifying suitable operational
decisions, i.e., by choosing an appropriate game.
4.1 The non-cooperative game
Consider a single shot two player non-cooperative game between service-provider (firm) and the user-set (market). As
part of SLAp the service-provider needs to ensure that primary class customers mean waiting time should not exceed
a specified level Sp, i.e., Wp(λs, β) ≤ Sp. The service-provider also needs to ensure that the mean waiting time of
secondary class customers, Ws(λs, β) does not exceed Ss. Unit admission price, θ, service level to secondary class
customers, Ss, and scheduling policy across classes, β are decided by the service-provider, player 1. User-set, player 2,
reacts according to a linear demand function (λs ≤ a− bθ − cSs) for a given admission price, θ, and service level, Ss.
But offered quality of service Ss depends on λs as Ss ≥Ws(λs, β). Hence, there is an interaction between the service
provider and user set and we are interested in the equilibrium in this interaction.
Strategy sets of one player depends on the other and hence they are coupled as in constraint games (See [23]).
Service provider’s strategy β is constrained by its dependence on strategy of secondary class customers, λs, (say,
constraint (3)). Similarly, the strategy set of the secondary class customers is constrained by strategies of the service
provider, constraint (5). User-set’s strategy space is R+ for the arrival rate λs.
4.2 Continuum of NE
In above two player non-cooperative game, we argue that a continuum of NE exists and discuss its computation via
a constrained best response dynamics.
For the given strategy λ¯s of player 2, the best response for player 1 can be obtained by following optimization
problem O1.
O1: max
θ,Ss,β
θλ¯s (34)
Subject to : Wp(λ¯s, β) ≤ Sp, (35)
Ws(λ¯s, β) ≤ Ss, (36)
λ¯s ≤ µ− λp, (37)
λ¯s ≤ a− bθ − cSs, (38)
θ, Ss ≥ 0, β ∈ R+ ∪∞.
For the given strategy (θ¯, S¯s, β¯) of player 1, the best response of player 2 can be obtained by the trivial optimization
problem O2:
O2: max
λs
λs
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Subject to : λs ≤ a− bθ¯ − cS¯s. (39)
It can be argued that the above best-response dynamics converges in one step as Equation (38) and (39) hold with
equality for either player. It can be easily seen that Equation (39) hold with equality for player 2 due to maximization
nature of objective function. Further, Equation (38) will hold with equality as Wp(λ¯s, β) is an increasing concave
function of β ≥ 0 and Ws(λ¯s, β) is a decreasing convex function of β ≥ 0. Thus, a continuum of NE exists for any
feasible λ¯s which can be easily computed using above best-response dynamics.
Remark 1. One of the key insights of the best response dynamics approach is as follows. One can extend the model
to non-linear demand functions (such as Cobb-Douglas) using the above best response dynamics. On the other hand,
such a generalization would need sophisticated non-linear optimization problem solving scheme if it is approached from
standard optimization methods (by formulating problems P1 and P2 as in Section 2).
4.3 Revenue maximal NE
In above continuum of NE, it is desirable to find the revenue maximal NE for a given game. Following result
characterizes the revenue maximal NE and it is indeed given by the finite step algorithm of Section 3.1.
Theorem 4.1. (λ∗s, θ
∗, S∗s , β
∗) is revenue maximal NE for above non-cooperative two player game.
Proof. The optimization problem O1 is same as optimization problem P0 with fixed λ∗s and hence its feasible space
is a subset of that of P0. And (λ∗s, θ
∗, S∗s , β
∗) is a feasible point for problem O1. Thus, (θ∗, S∗s , β
∗) is the optimal
solution for problem O1 as we know that optimal solution of P0 is unique from section 3.2. Hence, (θ∗, S∗s , β
∗) is the
best response of player 1 for player 2’s strategy λ∗s. The optimal scheduling variable β
∗ could be such that β∗ <∞ or
β∗ =∞ as determined by the comparison of optimization problems P1 and P2.
Above result follows from the constraint best response optimization problems O1 and O2.
4.4 Pricing and revenue management
Revenue management deals with offering different prices based on customer segments. The most common examples
are pricing “perishable products” and capacity management in airline tickets, high-tech products such as computers
and cell phones, high fashion apparel, hospitality industry, fruits and vegetables (see [29]). We present a revenue
management scheme via revenue maximal NE in above strategic interaction between service-provider and user-set, in
the context of potentially nonperishable items.
We illustrate the computation of revenue maximal NE with a synthetic data set via finite step algorithm for
different games. We show that both the service-provider and user-set can benefit at a different revenue maximal NE
by playing a different game with marginal inconvenience to primary class of customers. For the model parameters as
Sp Priority β
∗ Arrival rate λ∗s Price θ
∗ Assured SL S∗s Revenue O
∗
0.29 0 0.1775 1196.4 0.5977 212.36
0.35 0 1.4556 1182.7 0.9242 1721.54
0.45 0 3.5858 1157.4 2.23 4150.20
0.75 0.011 5.6655 1085 19.432 6147.07
1 0.025 5.6655 1085 19.1672 6147.07
8 0.6715 5.6655 1108.1 11.754 6277.94
9.823 1 5.6655 1113.9 9.8233 6310.80
10 1.0389 5.6655 1144 9.6359 6481.33
12 1.624 5.6655 1208 7.5178 6843.92
19 ∞ 5.6719 1141.7 0.5195 6475.61
23 ∞ 5.72 1141.2 0.5264 6527.66
32 ∞ 5.799 1140.4 0.5359 6613.18
Table 1: Parameter setting: a = 120, b = 0.1, c = 0.3, λp = 6, µ = 12, σ = 0.2.
given in Table 1, we compute revenue maximal NE for different primary class customers threshold Sp. We have an
interesting observation: By marginally increasing the mean waiting time of the primary class customers Sp from 9.823
to 10, the service-provider can quote a shorter mean waiting of 9.6359 as opposed to 9.823 for an increase in price
form 1113.9 to 1144. This was possible by giving higher dynamic priority to them as β∗ is increased to 1.0389 from
equal priority 1. This new operating point is also revenue maximal NE (for a game with new Sp) and results in extra
revenue to service-provider as well as shorter mean waiting times to secondary class customers.
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Remark 2. Another managerial insight from this works is that there is no need to offer service to secondary customers
or offer in very low volumes when Sp is low. Additionally, for the middle range of service level, the model gives pure
dynamic priority scheduling parameter (0 < β <∞) which should be optimal.
5 Discussion
We proposed a queue based game model to capture the strategic interaction between waiting time sensitive user-set
and revenue oriented service-provider. We show that a continuum of NE exists and the revenue maximal NE in
this continuum can be easily computed via a finite step algorithm, which is now valid as we settled the associated
conjecture for the algorithm. Several interesting game theoretic issues are under investigation such as impact of non-
linear demand function in strategic interaction, intervention or mechanism design for the market so that it reaches the
revenue maximal NE.
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